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INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 CPR-02 OASY-00 DODE-00

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TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINR, RW, UG

SUBJECT: INR ANALYSIS - RWANDA: RPF GOALS

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LONDON FOR MCKINLEY, PARIS FOR PERLOW, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, USNATO FOR HAMILTON

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT
- 2. THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF FEBRUARY 25, 1993, IS PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENT, AS APPROPRIATE.

BEGIN TEXT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

DECLASSIFY AFTER: 26 FEB 2013 DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2005 200103014

- 3. THE ATTACK BY THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) INTO NORTHERN RWANDA, WITH REPORTS OF WIDESPREAD ATROCITIES, INDICATE THE REBELS ARE NOT SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO POWERSHARING WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA. RATHER, THE RPF, CONTROLLED BY ETHNIC TUTSI, SEEKS TO CONTROL THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT AND WANTS TO FORCE HABYARIMANA TO RESIGN.
- 4. RPF ACTIONS. WHILE THE RPF HAS NOT TAKEN ANY MAJOR
 ----- TOWNS, IT NOW DOMINATES PERHAPS
 ONE-THIRD OF THE COUNTRYSIDE NORTH OF KIGALI AND HOLDS
 THE MILITARY INITIATIVE. RPF ATTACKS SINCE FEBRUARY 8
 HAVE CONCENTRATED AROUND RUHENGERI AND BYUMBA AND THE
 ROADS CONNECTING THESE TOWNS TO THE CAPITAL.

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

NUMEROUS REPORTS THAT RPF FORCES ARE SYSTEMATICALLY
KILLING LARGE NUMBERS OF CIVILIANS AND OFFICIALS IN
HABYARIMANA'S NORTHERN POLITICAL STRONGHOLDS COME MAINLY
FROM RWANDAN GOVERNMENT SOURCES AND ALSO HAVE NOT BEEN
CONFIRMED. RPF ATTACKS IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS HAVE
DISPLACED OVER 600,000 CIVILIANS.

1.4(D)

- 6. IRONICALLY, THE RPF HAD WON MAJOR POLITICAL CONCESSIONS FROM THE REGIME IN THE ARUSHA PROTOCOL OF

JANUARY 9 THOUGH HABYARIMANA BALKED AT IMPLEMENTING IT. BY COOPERATING WITH INTERNAL OPPOSITION PARTIES, THE RPF

HAD ISOLATED HABYARIMANA, HIS REVOLUTIONARY NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY (MRND) AND THE EXTREMIST COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CDR) (SEE ANNEX FOR DETAILS). IT WAS NEGOTIATING FOR A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF MILITARY POWER (PERHAPS UP TO 50 CONFIDENTIAL

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PERCENT REPRESENTATION IN THE FAR), FOR A REMOVAL OF
LOCAL OFFICIALS APPOINTED BY HABYARIMANA, AND FOR THE
DEPARTURE OF FRENCH TROOPS. THOUGH THE ARUSHA TALKS HAD
STALLED, CHANCES WERE GOOD THE RPF WOULD HAVE EVENTUALLY
ACHIEVED THESE OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF THE OPPOSITION
PARTIES' CONTINUED FOCUS ON STRIPPING HABYARIMANA OF HIS
POWERS.

- 8. AN EARLY RPF ATTACK ON KIGALI IS UNLIKELY AS LONG AS SOME 500 FRENCH TROOPS PROVIDE A DETERRENT. MOREOVER, THE RPF LACKS THE ABILITY TO ADMINISTER KIGALI AT THIS POINT. IF RPF LEADERS MOVE TOO QUICKLY TO BASE THEMSELVES IN KIGALI, THEY WOULD MAKE THEMSELVES VULNERABLE TO AN ANTI-TUTSI BACKLASH; MORE THAN 85 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S POPULATION IS HUTU.
- 9. RPF CALCULATIONS. THE RPF IS PLAYING ON DEEP

 ------ DIVISIONS BETWEEN HABYARIMANA AND
 THE INTERNAL OPPOSITION PARTIES AND MAY HOPE THAT THE
 INTERNAL PARTIES DEPOSE HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND. EVEN
 THE RENEWED TUTSI ATTACK FAILED TO SWING THE HUTU
 OPPOSITION PARTIES BEHIND THE PRESIDENT, AND OPPOSITION

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LEADERS ARE STILL OBSESSED WITH MANEUVERING FOR
SHORT-TERM POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AGAINST HIM. THOUGH SOME
PARTY LEADERS MAY SLOWLY BE REALIZING THAT THE RPF COULD
BE A BIGGER THREAT THAN HABYARIMANA, THEY ARE
DISORGANIZED, DIVIDED, FEARFUL AND UNWILLING TO TAKE A
CLEAR STAND.

10. THE RPF ALSO CALCULATES THAT THE FRENCH WILL TIRE OF SUPPORTING HABYARIMANA. RPF LEADERS PROBABLY BELIEVE FRANCE WILL NOT LONG SUSTAIN SUPPORT TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER SO MUCH FIRE FOR ITS HUMAN RIGHTS

ABUSES. THE RPF PROBABLY HOPES TO LIMIT FOREIGN INTERVENTION TO PROMOTING AND GIVING INTERNATIONAL BLESSING TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE RPF AGREES TO END THE WAR IN EXCHANGE FOR A DOMINANT ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY SERVICES.

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12. RPF LEADERS ARE WELL-INSULATED FROM SUCH PRESSURES
AS LONG AS THEY CONTROL THE MILITARY SITUATION AND STAY
AWAY FROM CONCENTRATIONS OF ARMED HUTU. ANTI-TUTSI
VIOLENCE MAINLY HURTS CIVILIANS AND GIVES THE RPF AN
EXCUSE FOR ITS OWN ATROCITIES. MOREOVER, WITH A
SAFEHAVEN AND LOGISTICAL BASE IN UGANDA, THE RPF CAN
HOLD OUT INDEFINITELY, DESTABILIZING RWANDA UNTIL KIGALI
AGREES TO ITS TERMS. THE SUCCESS OF UGANDAN PRESIDENT
MUSEVENI, WHO SPENT YEARS IN THE BUSH BEFORE TAKING
POWER, PROVIDES A POTENT EXAMPLE TO HIS RPF PROTEGES.
INDEED, MANY RPF FIGHTERS FOUGHT ALONGSIDE MUSEVENI IN
UGANDA'S CIVIL WAR.

13. GIVEN THE HARD-LINE ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS THAT ALL SIDES HAVE BEEN DEMONSTRATING, RWANDA PROBABLY WILL BE GRIPPED BY SPASMS OF INTENSE VIOLENCE UNTIL THE RPF IS APPEASED--AND PROBABLY AFTER.

ANNEX: POWERSHARING, ARUSHA-STYLE

14. ACCORDING TO THE ARUSHA PROTOCOL OF JANUARY 9, PART OF A LARGER PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH THE RPF, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT WOULD BE REPLACED &Y A NEW REGIME LED BY AN EXECUTIVE CABINET. EACH OF THE CABINET'S 21 MEMBERS PLUS THE PRESIDENT WOULD VOTE ON LEGISLATION, WHICH COULD BE VETOED IF ONE-THIRD OF THEM VOTE AGAINST IT. HABYARMIMANA AND THE MRND OPPOSE THE PROTOCOL BECAUSE IT

WOULD GIVE THE MRND ONLY FIVE SEATS (SIX INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT'S), SHORT OF THE ONE-THIRD NECESSARY TO BLOCK CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 07 STATE 060346 270757Z LEGISLATION.

- 15. BY CONTRAST THE RPF AND THE OPPOSITION COALITION WOULD HOLD 16 SEATS--MORE THAN THE TWO-THIRDS NECESSARY TO OVERRIDE THE MRND AND THE PRESIDENT. THE RPF WITH FIVE SEATS, WOULD HAVE A BLOCKING THIRD IF IT COMBINED ITS VOTES WITH THE TUTSI-DOMINATED (AND PRO-RPF) LIBERAL PARTY (LP), WHICH WOULD HAVE THREE SEATS. THE OTHER INTERNAL PARTIES WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO COMBINE TO WIN A BLOCKING THIRD AS THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT (MDR), WHICH REPRESENTS MAINLY SOUTHERN HUTU, WOULD GET FOUR SEATS, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY THREE. AND THE TINY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY ONE.
- 16. IF THE PROPOSED INTERIM GOVERNMENT WERE TO BECOME FULLY FUNCTIONAL, SUCH NEAT ALLIANCES MAY WELL BREAK DOWN, ALLOWING THE MRND AND HABYARIMANA TO WIELD MORE INFLUENCE. BECAUSE A SHARED DESIRE TO UNDERCUT HABYARIMANA/MRND POWER IS THE GLUE THAT HOLDS THE OPPOSITION-RPF ALLIANCE TOGETHER, THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO FEEL THAT HIS OPPONENTS MAY NOT TURN AGAINST ONE ANOTHER UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE MARGINALIZED HIM. CHRISTOPHER

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